Key recovery
Your murk key is derived from a BIP39 mnemonic, the same scheme used by
most crypto wallets. murk init generates 256 bits of entropy, prints it as
24 recovery words, and derives your age keypair directly from those bytes
(no intermediate hashing step: same bytes, same key every time).

Write the words down when you run murk init
Section titled “Write the words down when you run murk init”murk initThe 24 words print once, at key-generation time. Write them down somewhere durable and offline: a password manager, a physical safe, whatever your threat model calls for. Anyone with your 24 words has your key: treat the phrase exactly like the key itself. Don’t paste it into chat, don’t commit it, don’t screenshot it into a note-taking app synced to the cloud without thinking about who else can read that account.
Recovering a lost key
Section titled “Recovering a lost key”If you lose the key file itself (new machine, wiped disk, whatever) but still have the recovery phrase, restore it:
murk restoreThis prompts for your 24-word phrase with hidden input and re-derives your
original keypair. Because the derivation is deterministic, the restored key
is identical to the one murk init generated: same public key, so you’re
still a valid recipient on any vault that already authorized you. Nothing on
the vault side needs to change.
Displaying your phrase again
Section titled “Displaying your phrase again”If you still have your key but want to re-display (or re-back-up) its recovery phrase:
murk recoverThis re-derives the 24-word phrase from your current MURK_KEY (useful if
you generated a key and didn’t securely record the phrase the first time).
What recovery does and doesn’t cover
Section titled “What recovery does and doesn’t cover”Recovery restores your key, not the vault. It’s local to your machine and
has nothing to do with git. Losing the .murk file itself isn’t a
recovery-phrase problem, since the file lives in your repo and git already
keeps history for it.
Recovery phrases also only apply to raw age keys. If you’re using a hardware-backed identity (YubiKey, Secure Enclave, FIDO2), there is no BIP39 phrase to write down. See hardware keys for how recovery works differently there.
If you’re recovering because your machine (and therefore your key) was
compromised, don’t stop at murk restore: rotate the secrets that key could
read once you’re back in, the same as you would for any other exposed
credential. See offboarding a teammate for the
revoke-and-rotate pattern, and the CLI reference
for the full command surface.